As for the other major cause of the 2008 crisis, Credit Default Swaps, I've also written about before on another thread.
First, what's being talked about now:
Crisis Prevention: Trying to Tame Derivatives Markets - TheFiscalTimes.com Quote: Congress tasked the Commodity Futures Trading Commission with shedding light on the opaque derivatives markets and bringing the majority of market activity -- possibly 80 or 90 percent -- into clearinghouses and centralized trading facilities. At stake is which market participants will profit and the cost of the new rules. Derivatives, financial contracts whose value is based on the price of an underlying asset such as a commodity, interest rate or currency, have been wildly profitable for Wall Street in recent years. The five largest U.S. dealers reaped an estimated $28 billion in 2009, according to an analysis by Bloomberg News.
The CFTC has received thousands of comments on its 30 separate rulemakings ordered by last summer's Dodd-Frank financial regulatory overhaul, with everyone from J.P. Morgan Chase and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange to the Air Transport Association and Cargill weighing in on requirements for registration, reporting, margin, capital, ownership of centralized institutions and preventing conflicts of interest. Big corporations and House Republicans want to preserve the ability to innovate, which caused OTC derivatives to explode in volume over the last two decades. Consumer advocates want the commission to open up the complex market to avoid a repeat of the 2008 financial crisis, when uncertainty about which institutions were exposed to losses caused capital markets to freeze up and threatened a chain reaction of bank failures. Big commercial interests want to avoid becoming subject to requirements aimed at derivatives dealers and startup trading platforms aim to compete with the established dealers.
---
The commission is proposing new rules almost exactly a decade after Congress blocked it from regulating OTC derivatives in the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000. Futures and OTC derivatives are similar financial contracts, but derivatives have been privately negotiated between two institutions rather than trading on an exchange with terms and prices that everyone can see. The current regulatory effort could transform the derivatives markets into quasi-futures markets, which are closely regulated and whose lobbyists have argued for years that big banks unfairly escape regulation and its associated costs through OTC derivatives.
So, if we're tracing blame here, what was this Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000?
Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Quote: On September 14, 2000, the SEC and CFTC announced they had agreed on a joint regulation approach for “security futures.” Senior Treasury Department officials hailed the “historic agreement” as eliminating “the major obstacles to forming a consensus bill.” [52] At the same time, Senator Phil Gramm (R-TX), the Chair of the Senate Banking Committee, was quoted as insisting that any bill brought to the Senate Floor would need to be expanded to include prohibitions on SEC regulation of the swaps market.[53]
Democratic members of Congress later described a period in late September through early October during which they were excluded from negotiations over reconciling the three committee versions of H.R. 4541, followed by involvement in reaching an acceptable compromise that left some Republicans unhappy with the final version of the bill and some Democrats upset over the “process”, particularly the involvement of Sen. Gramm and House Republican leadership in the negotiations.[54] Despite indications no agreement would be reached, on October 19, 2000, the White House announced its “strong support” for the version of H.R. 4541 scheduled to reach the House Floor that day.[55] The House approved H.R. 4541 in a 377-4 vote.[56]
As so passed by the House, H.R. 4541 contained, in Title I, the language concerning OTC derivatives that became the source for Title I of the CFMA and, in Title II, the language regulating “security futures” that became the source for Title II of the CFMA. Titles III and IV would be added when the CFMA was enacted into law two months later.[57]
From H.R. 4541 to the CFMA
After the House passed H.R. 4541, press reports indicated Sen. Gramm was blocking Senate action based on his continued insistence that the bill be expanded to prevent the SEC from regulating swaps, and the desire to broaden the protections against CFTC regulation for “bank products.”[58] Nevertheless, with Congress adjourned for the 2000 elections, but scheduled to return for a “lame duck” session, Treasury Secretary Summers “urged” Congress to move forward with legislation on OTC derivatives based on the “extraordinary bipartisan consensus this year on these very complex issues.”.[59]
When Congress returned into session for two days in mid-November, the sponsor of H.R. 4541, Representative Thomas Ewing (R-IL), described Senator Gramm as the “one man” blocking Senate passage of H.R. 4541.[60] Senator Richard G. Lugar (R-IN), the sponsor of S. 2697, was reported to be considering forcing H.R. 4541 to the Senate Floor against Senator Gramm’s objections.[61]
After Congress returned into session on December 4, 2000, there were reports Senator Gramm and the Treasury Department were exchanging proposed language to deal with the issues raised by Sen. Gramm, followed by a report those negotiations had reached an impasse.[62] On December 14, however, the Treasury Department announced agreement had been reached the night before and urged Congress to enact into law the agreed upon language.[63]
The “compromise language” was introduced in the House on December 14, 2000, as H.R. 5660.[64] The same language was introduced in the Senate on December 15, 2000 as S. 3283.[65] The Senate and House conference that was called to reconcile differences in H.R. 4577 appropriations adopted the “compromise language” by incorporating H.R. 5660 (the “CFMA”) into H.R. 4577, which was titled “Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY 2001”.[66] The House passed the Conference Report and, therefore, H.R. 4577 in a vote of 292-60.[67] The Senate passed the Conference Report, and therefore H.R. 4577, by “unanimous consent.”[68] The Chairs and Ranking members of each of the five Congressional Committees that considered H.R. 4541 or S. 2697 supported, or entered into the Congressional Record statements in support of, the CFMA. The PWG issued letters expressing the unanimous support of each of its four members for the CFMA.[69] H.R. 4577, including H.R. 5660, was signed into law by President Clinton on December 21, 2000.[70]
Passed by a Republican congress and signed by Clinton, with specific fateful input from Senator Phil Gramm (R-TX), the Chair of the Senate Banking Committee.
However, again I sound the same theme: what was portrayed as a limited but useful innovation - the ability to insure or hedge against default risk in the bond market, thus increasing liquidity and reducing overall risk - soon after morphed into a huge market used for engineering profit with little connection to the original intent.
That is, these CDSs as originally thought up were used by issuers or buyers of debt to hedge default risk and allow lower borrowing costs. But as these were profitable instruments, in the Wall Street culture they became an independent product, used by non-stakeholders to place bets on companies and debt. And AIG was making a mint along the way. It was this uncontolled growth of the market - again in the absence of both internal and external controls - that hugely magnified the '08 crisis.
The moral of the story: the government and the public must be careful when to trust private enterprise, especially the financial industry, when it insists on the need to do things away from regulation or public markets. And that whatever the immediate, legitimate, need, someone will figure out how to misuse the thing to generate profits.