SPARX GROUP is an Asia-based hedge fund and activist investor. Such funds often purchase blocks of shares in asset-rich companies when sales and earnings are off-cycle and attempt to force management to act contrary to the long-term interests of the company in order to achieve short term share price appreciation for themselves.
Pentax Corporation owned significant underutilized real estate and manufacturing assets in Japan - really prime land and facilities - and a large patent portfolio in medical devices, eyeglasses, optical coating process engineering and others..Return on equity in thes areas can be well above 20%. Return on equity in consumer photographic equipment is around 8% in the best times.
Without writing a Master's Thesis in Finance, in order to monetize it's investment SPARX wanted to bring the high-return operations to another company, sell as much real estate as possible and dispose of low-return assets efficiently. Eyeglasses were sold by Pentax to Seiko as a defensive maneuver (my molded tri-focal eyeglass lenses are actually Seiko / Pentax), but the Board did not approve selling medical devices to Hoya during the post dot com recession at low market multiples.
In response, SPARX and Hoya obtained private financing, made a hostile tender offer for all Pentax shares and convinced institutions to sell. Hoya took (generally) high return divisions and Factory in a Park, SPARX took real estate, and Hoya/SPARX kept cameras - for one reason and one reason only; the inventory of lenses built up as the global economy had slowed.
The best way to liquidate that asset was to keep the brand just alive enough to keep the lenses saleable at retail, but to liquidate them quickly. 'Just alive enough' included finishing products already in development and extending products by reusing existing engineering (such as 645D, which facilitated selling 645 lenses)., At the same time they dumped DSLR lenses in the USA at stupid low prices, tarnishing the brand as cheap, after closing every in-house operation and outsourcing them. In essence the USA became an Internet distribution operation through B&H, Adorama and Amazon, with virtually no physical assets and only 50 employees. I have heard the company Vice President Marketing was the commissioned salesman for B&H and Adorama. There were only two other sales reps. The company President was supposedly bonuses on inventory draw. To save money Pentax infrastructure and dealer relationships were dismantled -so completely that they might never be rebuilt.
It is said Ricoh paid only $140,000,000 for the brand, some plants overseas and a few specific patents. What isn't known is the assumed soft cost - the known investment it would require to make Pentax a viable brand again.
I read an investment banking report published by the Japanese division of my former employer that stated to compete with Canon and Nikon on their terms would require an immediate investment of $1,400,000,000, a number Ricoh could not afford since they were already committed to a $1,200,000,000 investment in a China factory and entering the MFP market.
Thus Ricoh has chosen the insurgent business model we see today.
Some of you might clarify or reorder these points. I won't spend Sunday afternoon researching and verifying dates and sequence, but this is, I believ generally correct. I welcome corrections and amplifications.